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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH \ 
Plaintiff-Appellant, I 
[ Case No. 
VS
* f 1 3 8 4 5 
RICHARD ARTHUR CHAMBERS, \ 
Defendant-Respondent. J 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the order denying plain-
tiff's motion for order staying execution of expunge-
ment enteredi on September 4, 1974, in the above en-
titled action 
DISPOSITION IN T H E LOWER COURT 
On the 8th day of July, 1974, pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Cocje Ann. Sec. 77-35T17 (1953) 
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the lower court in Criminal Case No. 1372 and 1378 
allowed the defendant to withdraw his former plea of 
"guilty" and dismissed those complaints and in addition 
thereto ordered the records of criminal cases numbered 
1370 to 1379, all of which had been dismissed, to be 
expunged. On the 22nd day of July, 1974, the County 
Attorney for Cache County, B. H . Harris, filed a 
motion for order to stay execution of expungement 
order until the necessary time has elapsed (pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1973) in 
criminal cases numbered 1370 to 1379. On the 4th day 
of September, 1974, the court made its order denying 
the motion, stating that Section 77-35-17.5 (enacted in 
1973) was not applicable and that he had acted pur-
suant to Section 77-35-17. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Respondent requests that this court sustain the 
lower court's order. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Defendant Richard Chambers, Mayor of Logan 
City, on and after the 17th day of January, 1972, was 
charged with various separate complaints with num-
erous counts within each complaint, in the City Court 
of Logan. There were ten separate cases filed. Under 
normal practice eight of the ten would have been filed 
under one complaint. They all involved a time when 
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the Mayor was in office and related to the handling of 
public funds. Why eight of the ten were filed sep-
arately no one will know unless the County Attorney 
felt the publicity of the numbers would help his cause 
publicly. Evidently his guess was right for it brought 
him an appearance on television. 
With the number of cases filed and the publicity 
given before trial by the local press, radio and tele-
vision and after the defendant was bound over to the 
District Court, a motion for change of venue was filed 
which was granted, and the cases were transferred to 
Box Elder County District Court for trial. 
During the preliminary hearings all charges of 
grand larceny were dismissed. There being no evidence 
to support them, which the County Attorney must have 
known when he made the complaints, yet, he placed 
the same in the complaints and referred to the eight 
counts of grand larceny on television. 
When the cases were transferred to Box Elder 
County, Judge Christoffersen disqualified himself and 
invited Judge D. Frank Wilkins to preside and Jay 
Banks, the District Attorney for tlje Third District, 
took over for David Sorenson of the First District. 
On the 4th day of April, 1972, a hearing was held 
in Brigham City before the Honorable D. Frank Wil-
kins and the defendant in Criminal Case No. 1372 
entered his plea of guilty to the charge of "Making a 
Profit Out of Public Money" (R. 51) and in Criminal 
Case No. 1378 he entered his plea to "Misusing Public 
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Funds" (R. 51); on this same day the court dismissed 
all of the other cases on motion of the District Attorney 
concurred in by the defendant. (T. 18-19). 
In Criminal No. 1372 and also No. 1378 the de-
fendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the 
Utah State Prison from 0-5 years and placed on pro-
bation on condition that he serve one year in the Box 
Elder County Jail ; both sentences to run concurrently 
(R. 22 and R. 82). H e commenced his incarceration 
April 24,1972. " 
On August 21, 1972, a hearing was held before 
Judge Wilkins (R. 54) and Mr. Chambers was placed 
on probation for one year and released from the Box 
Elder County Jail. 
On July 8, 1974, in Cases 1372 and 1378 (R. 60) 
we have: 
"The record shows according to records of Adult 
Probation and Parole Department — defendant 
successfully dismissed from probation." 
and after a hearing the order of July 8, 1974, was 
signed by the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, pur-
suant to Section 77-35-17 Utah Code Annotated. 
(1953). 
Thereafter the vendetta carried on by the County 
Attorney, B. H . Harris, was again renewed and his 
motion for order to stay execution of expungement 
order until the necessary statutory time has elapsed, 
was filed. When his motion was denied he sought the 
aid of the Attorney General on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
T H E STATE OF UTAH HAS NOT PRED* 
ICATED ITS APPEAL ON ANY GROUND 
AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE AS REQUIRED 
BY SECTION 77-39-4 UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED (1953) AND SAID PURPORTED AP-
PEAL MUST BE DISMISSED. 
The legislature of this state has decreed the cir-
cumstances wherein the State of Utah may appeal in 
criminal cases. The grounds for appeal are enumerated 
by Utah Code Annotated §77-39-4 (1953). This sec-
tion states: 
"77-39-4 Appeal by state, in what cases. — An 
Appeal may be taken by the state: 
(1) From a judgment of dismissal in favor of 
the defendant upon a motion to quash the in-
formation or indictment. 
(2) From an order arresting judgment 
(3) From an order made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the state. 
(4) From an order of the court directing the 
jury to find for the defendant." 
It is obvious that grounds 1, 2 and 4 enumerated 
above, have no bearing on this appeal. The only pos* 
sible ground under which the state could Jxope to squeeze 
in on this appeal would be number 3: 
"iFrom an order made after judgment affecting 
the substantial rights of the {state/' 
5 
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In State v. Callahan, 26 U2d 304, 488 P2d 1048 
(1971) the Supreme Court of the State of Utah cited 
Section 77-39-4 and held that the State of Utah in 
order to appeal must come within the provisions of 
this section. The court then held that since the State 
had not predicated its appeal upon any of the grounds, 
the appeal must be dismissed. See, also, Hartman v. 
Weggeland, 19 U2d 229, 429 P2d 978 (1967). 
In Callahan, supra, the State asserted that there 
was an order "made after judgment affecting the sub-
stantial rights of the state." The state there urged that 
the trial court's decision holding invalid the delegation 
of authority to enact regulations to the Board of Parks 
and Recreation did affect the substantial rights of the 
state. The court, in spite of a dissenting opinion, re-
jected this assertion, and dismissed the appeal. The 
confurring opinion pointed out that if the state was 
fearful of similar rulings it could cause a declaratory 
judgment action to be filed to determine whether the 
legislature made a constitutional delegation of authority 
to the Board of Parks and Recreation. 
In view of the Callahan decision, it would seem 
that if the state seriously believes Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1973) supercedes Sec. 77-35-17 and 
if it fears similar rulings, it should bring a declaratory 
judgment action to determine the relationship of the 
two sections. 
I t is further pointed out that the plaintiff's objec-
tion to expungiement dated July 5, 1974 (R. 30) and 
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the plaintiff's motion to stay execution of expunge-
ment order dated July 22, 1974 (R. 36) listed only 
one reason for objection, that reason being that Sec-
tion 77-35-17.5 requires a five year waiting period. 
At the trial level the state did not assert that the 
court abused its discretion; the state did not assert that 
the guilty plea should not be withdrawn and the com-
plaints dismissed; the state did not assert the expung-
ing order was not compatible with the public interest; 
nor did the state assert that there was anything in the 
defendant's background to indicate he had not been 
rehabilitated. Courts have recognized that parties who 
fail at trial to make timely objections stating thje 
reasons therefore, lack standing to raise different rea-
sons for the first time on appeal. See State v. Valdez, 
19 U2d 426, 432 P2d 53 (1967). The state's sole as-
sertion was that a newly enacted statute, U.C.A. Sec. 
77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1973) required a five year waiting 
period before expunging the record of the defendant. 
There are no "substantial rights of the state" involved 
in this appeal. The state therefore has no right to ap-
peal and this court should follow the Callahan decision 
and dismiss this appeal. 
P O I N T I I 
U T A H CODE A N N O T A T E D SEC. 77-35-17 
(1953) W A S N O T R E P E A L E D BY T H E E N -
A C T M E N T OF U T A H CODE A N N O T A T E D 
SEC. 77-35-17.5 ( S U P P . 1973) 
7 
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Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-17 (1953) 
states as follows: 
"77-35-17. Suspension of sentence — Probation 
— Conditions of probation — Power of court to 
dismiss or discharge defendant — Upon a plea of 
guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, if 
it appears compatible with the public interest, 
the court having jurisdiction may suspend the 
imposition or the execution of sentence and may 
place the defendant on probation for such period 
of time as the court shall determine. 
The court may subsequently increase or de-
crease the probation period, and may revoke or 
modify any condition of probation. While on 
probation, the defendant may be required to pay, 
in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the 
time of being placed on probation; may be re-
quired to make restitution or reparation to the 
aggrieved party or parties for the actual dam-
ages or losses caused by the offense to which the 
defendant has pleaded guilty or for which con-
viction was had; and may be required to provide 
for the support of his wife or others for whose 
support he may be legally liable. Where it ap-
pears to the court from the report of the proba-
tion agent in charge of the defendant, or other-
wise\, that the defendant has complied with the 
conditions of such probation, the court may if it 
be compatible with the public interest either upon 
motion of the district attorney or of its own mo-
tion terminate the sentence or set aside the plea 
of guilty or conviction of the defendant and dis-
miss the action and discharge the defendant" 
(emphasis added) 
S 
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The reason behind the provision of this section al-
lowing a guilty plea to be withdrawn and the com-
plaint to be dismissed as stated by the court in State 
v. Schreiber, 121 Utah 653, 245 P2d 222, 224 (1952) is: 
". . . for the purpose of permitting the court 
under unusual circumstances and for good cause 
to expunge the record of the crime." (emphasis 
added). 
I t is clear that Section 77-35-17 (1953) allows the 
expungement of a defendant's record and in conjunc-
tion with such power a court may issue whatever order 
it feels necessary to carry out its decision. 
The state's contention that U.C.A. 77-35-17.5 
(Supp. 1973) must be given effect is clearly erroneous. 
The fact that both sections deal with the same subject 
matter does not mean that one section supercedes an-
other. This general rule was recognized in Davis v. 
King County, 77 Wash 2d 930, 468 P2d 679 (1970) 
where the Washington Court stated: 
"Where two legislative enactments relate to the 
same subject matter and are not actually in con-
flict, they should be interpreted to give meaning 
and effect to both." 
Even the most cursory reading of 77-35-17 and 77-35-
17.5 reveals that the two sections are not in conflict. 
The same type of contention the state makes here 
was raised in the cases of State v. Judd, 27 U2d 79, 
493 P2d 604 (1972) and State v. Ahram, 27 U2d 266, 
495 P2d 313 (1972). In these eases it was urged that 
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the Uniform Act on Paternity U.C.A. 78-45a-l (1953) 
repeated or superceded the provision of the Bastardy 
Act U.C.A. 77-60-1 (1953). This contention was re-
jected in both cases. The court in Judd cited the ap-
plicable rule of construction from McCoy v. Severson 
118 Utah 502, 508, 222 P2d 1058 (1956): 
' "I t is a rule of statutory construction that where 
there are two or more statutes dealing with the 
same subject matter they will be construed so as 
to maintain the integrity of both. Repeal by im-
plication is not effected unless the terms of the 
later enacted law are irreconcilable with the 
former." 
There is absolutely nothing to indicate that the 
legislature attempted to supercede or repeal 77-35-17. 
The Schreiber case, supra, is a long standing decision 
governing expungement and should the legislature have 
decided to repeal the statute they could have expressly 
provided for its repeal. There is nothing to indicate 
either, expressly or impliedly that the legislature in-
tended to repeal 77-35-17. I t is therefor clear that both 
statutes are in effect and while each may have dif-
ferent procedures, both statutes may be used for ex-
pungement. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT C O R R E C T L Y H E L D 
T H A T T J I E P R O V I S I O N S O F U T A H CODE 
ANN. §77-35-17 (1953) G O V E R N E D T H E D E -
F E N D A N T ' S E X P U N G E M E N T P R O C E E D -
I N G S . 
10 
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On July 8, 1974, the District Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17 (1953) ordered that the 
defendant's plea be withdrawn, the complaints be dis-
missed and the records be expunged (R. 33-35). The 
Cache County Attorney then filed an objection (R. 36) 
and on August 6, 1974, the District Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision stating: 
"As previously stated in the court's order, the 
basis for expungement was not on the basis of 
Section 77-35-17.5 but was on the basis of the 
previous section not repealed, Section 77-35-17, 
for the reason that the conviction in this case 
occurred prior to the enactment of 77-35-17.5 
and the court feels that, therefore, Section 77-
35-17 is the applicable statute and the five years 
would then not be in effect (R. 42)" 
Pursuant to the Memorandum Decision, the court, 
on September 4, 1974, signed an order denying a stay 
for expunging the record (R. 43, 44). 
The record shows the defendant made full restitu^-
tion of all money on January 5, 1972 (T.9 and 10), 
and defendant entered a plea of guilty on April 4, 
1972 (T. 1 through 19), was sentenced on April 18, 
1972 (R. 53), was incarcerated from April 24, 1972 to 
August 21, 1972 (R. 53, 54) and served probation 
from August 21, 1972, to October 9, 1973 (R. 24 and 
32). From October 9, A973, to July 8, 1974, the de-
fendant had been successfully employed and had lived 
an exemplary life. All of this was known to the trial 
court who, being aware of the circumstances ordered 
the expungement pursuant to 77-35-17. On May 8, 
11 
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1973, U.C.A. Section 77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1973) went 
into effect over one year from the date the defendant 
was originally sentenced, and well after the defendant 
had been rehabilitated and had begun a new life for him-
self and family. 
The state, in its brief, attempted to show that the 
trial court committed error in holding that the pro-
vision of 77-35-17.5 applied. Essentially, the state 
asserted that the enactment of 77-35-17.5 was not an 
ex post facto law and that statutory construction re-
quires that a specific statute govern over a general 
statute. 
The landmark decision of Colder v. Bull, 3 Dall 
386, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) set forth, among others, the 
following rule for determining an ex post facto law: 
"Every law that changes punishment and inflicts 
a greater punishment, than the law annexed to 
the crime when committed." 
This principal remains essentially unchanged to this 
present time. 
The difficulty in deciding whether a law is ex post 
facto lies in determining whether it changes punish-
ment. In order to make this determination certain 
courts have given labels to the effect of a law upon a 
defendant. For example courts have stated that if a 
defendant has a "right" then passage of new legisla-
tion is ex post facto, but if a defendant had only an 
"expectation" or his "right" to allowances was a matter 
of "grace" then new legislation is not ex post facto. See 
12 
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Graham v. Thompson, 246 F2d 805, (10th Cir. 1957). 
The temptation to place labels and then decide on the 
basis of a label sheds little light on the real question of 
whether it increases punishment to a defendant. 
In People v. Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702, 328 P2d 777, 
(1958) the court stated that a statute must be con-
sidered to be ex post facto if it alters the situation of 
the accused to his disadvantage. (See also In re Jones, 
500 P2d 690, 692 (Wyo. 1972). 
The case of In Be Griffin, 48 Cal. Rptr. 183, 408 
P2d 959, 961 (1965) dealt with a somewhat compli-
cated factual situation, but the effect of a statutory 
amendment was to increase the minimum time under 
which the defendant was inelligible for parole. The 
court did not try to say parole was a "right" or parole 
was a "matter of grace" but rather the court faced the 
issue squarely by stating: 
"Whatever the technical nature of a parole may 
be, from a realistic point of view it is our opinion 
that such a statute increased the punishment " 
In the case before this court it makes no real sense 
to say the defendant had no "right" to have his record 
expunged, or to say that expungement was a matter of 
"grace" or "discretion" to the court. To paraphrase 
the California court, whatever the technical nature of 
expungement may be, from a realistic poiiit of view, 
forcing this defendant to wait five years for expunge-
ment increases his punishment. After fully complying 
with his sentence and probation, and after making full 
13 
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restitution this defendant has begun a new productive 
life. He has become employed and is again a contribut-
ting member of society. The state for some reason, now 
desires to prolong and delay the time when he can have 
his record expunged. From a realistic point of view 
this is definitely an increase in punishment for until 
his record is expunged he is denied his voting rights 
and his right to hold public office. (See Const, of Utah 
Art. IV, Sec. 6). 
But, regardless of whether the act is deemed to 
be ex post facto3 rules of statutory interpretation de-
mand that the provisions of 77-35-17 take effect over 
77-35-17.5. 
In criminal eases it is widely recognized that where 
two statutes #iay impose different punishments, a de-
fendant is entitled to the lesser penalty even though the 
greater penalty may have been most recently enacted. 
See State v. Shondel, 22 U2d 343, 453 P2d 146 (1969) 
and State v Fair 23 U2d 34, 456 P2d 168 (1969). In 
view of these decisions it is clear that in criminal pun-
ishment cases this rule also prevails over the rule that 
the specific statute prevails over the general statute. 
In addition Utah law recognizes that when a de-
fendant is faced with alternative choices under a statute, 
he may comply by choosing the least burdensome al-
ternative. This was recognized in Ringwood v. State, 
8 U2d 287, 289, 333 P2d 943 (1959) where this court 
stateci: 
14 
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"We are aware of the requirements of our law 
that our statutes are to be given a liberal inter-
pretation to effectuate their purposes. This hav-
ing been said, however, it must also be recog-
nized that where a statute charges one with a 
duty or imposes a burden or a penalty, it must 
do so with sufficient clarity and definiteness that 
one of ordinary intelligence will understand what 
he is required to do. And in case of alternative 
choices, he can comply by selecting the one which 
is the least burdensome or least offensive to him." 
(footnotes omitted). 
Finally, district courts have long been recognized 
as having wide discretion in matters pertaining to sent-
encing, probation and expungement. The record is tot-
ally barren of any facts to disclose that it would not 
be compatible with the public interest to expunge the 
defendant's records. Surely in the absence of any evi-
dence it is highly presumptuous of the state to assert 
the trial court did not know what was compatible with 
the public interest. From his advantaged position, as 
a member of the community, as a person in contact 
with the probation department, and as a public official, 
the trial court correctly held that it would be compatible 
with the public interest to expunge the record of this 
defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent submits that the decision of the 
trial court was correct aijd that the trial court properly 
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ordered the record expunged, therefore the trial qourt's 
decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Walter G- Mann 
Attorney for respondent 
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